Member State or Peripheral Market?

Featured image: European Union flags outside the Berlaymont Building, Brussels, 2014. Photo: Thijs ter Haar / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 2.0. Commons crop; resized.

Romania’s Unequal Place in the European Union

Romania joined the European Union in 2007 with a clear national aspiration: to return politically, economically and institutionally to the European space from which communism had separated it.

Membership brought freedom of movement, foreign investment, access to the Single Market, infrastructure funding and a powerful framework for modernisation. Romanian citizens gained opportunities that had been inaccessible to previous generations, while businesses became connected to one of the world’s largest markets.

The economic transformation is undeniable. Romania’s GDP per capita, measured in purchasing-power terms, increased from approximately 44% of the EU average in 2007 to around 78% in 2024. Roads, water systems, schools, hospitals, businesses and local communities have benefited from European funding. The country’s integration into European production networks contributed to exports, productivity, employment and technological development.

Romania is not simply a victim of European integration. Nor can every domestic failure be blamed on Brussels.

But convergence in income does not automatically produce equality in economic power.

Nearly two decades after accession, a more difficult question must be asked: has Romania become an influential economic member of the Union—or primarily a market, labour reserve and production base within an economic system whose most valuable assets remain controlled elsewhere?

Convergence Is Real — but It Is Not the Whole Story

The strongest argument in favour of Romania’s EU membership is visible in the country’s economic convergence.

European integration opened markets, reduced commercial barriers, increased investor confidence and provided access to enormous development resources. Under the 2021–2027 cohesion framework, Romania has approximately €30.9 billion in EU cohesion-policy funding, increasing to roughly €42 billion when national co-financing is included. This represents the equivalent of around 8% of Romania’s 2024 GDP.

The Common Agricultural Policy provides a further EU contribution of approximately €15 billion for 2023–2027. Romania has also received substantial resources through the Recovery and Resilience Facility, although implementation delays and disputes over reforms have affected access to some funds.

These are not insignificant transfers. Any serious assessment must acknowledge that European funding has financed investments Romania might otherwise have postponed for decades.

EU membership also helped integrate Romanian manufacturing into European supply chains. The automotive sector, electrical equipment, components, pharmaceuticals, aviation-related production and information technology all expanded through access to capital, markets and technology.

The question, therefore, is not whether Romania benefited.

It did.

The real question is how much of the value generated by this integration remains under Romanian ownership, strengthens Romanian companies and increases the country’s long-term economic autonomy.

Integrated Into Europe — but Who Owns the Integration?

Romania’s exports appear, at first glance, to represent a national success story. But ownership data reveal a more complicated structure.

According to the OECD’s 2026 Economic Survey, foreign-controlled companies generated approximately 70% of Romania’s goods exports and 80% of its manufacturing exports in 2024. Foreign enterprises also generated around 56% of services exports. In 2023, foreign affiliates accounted for approximately 42% of the value added created in Romania’s economy while employing around 27% of workers.

These figures do not mean foreign companies are inherently harmful. They create employment, pay taxes, introduce technology, connect suppliers to international markets and frequently operate more productively than domestic firms.

Indeed, the productivity gap is striking. Foreign affiliates generated approximately €45,000 in gross value added per employee, compared with around €24,000 among domestically controlled firms.

But that gap also exposes Romania’s structural vulnerability.

The most internationally competitive part of its economy is disproportionately controlled by companies whose strategic decisions, intellectual property, research centres and ultimate ownership are situated elsewhere. Romania participates in production, but it does not always control the brand, technology, financing, distribution networks or final allocation of profit.

This distinction matters.

A factory located in Romania contributes to employment and exports. But if the highest-value functions — research, design, patents, strategic management and corporate finance—remain abroad, Romania captures only part of the economic value created by its own workers.

The country has become highly integrated into European production. It has been less successful at converting that integration into strong Romanian ownership.

A bulk carrier being loaded beneath cranes at the Port of Constanța
A bulk carrier being loaded at the Port of Constanța, October 2014. Archival image illustrating Romanian maritime trade. Photo: Mehlauge / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 3.0. Resized; image remains under CC BY-SA 3.0.

Investment Arrived; Domestic Capital Did Not Catch Up

Foreign investment was necessary for Romania’s post-communist reconstruction. The domestic economy entered the transition period with obsolete industrial assets, weak capital markets, politicised management and limited access to modern technology.

European capital filled part of that vacuum.

By 2024, Romania’s stock of foreign direct investment had reached approximately 35% of GDP, with around 87% originating from other EU member states. Foreign investment helped accelerate the country’s catch-up growth and connected Romania to global value chains.

However, Romania did not develop an equally strong strategy for creating domestic companies capable of growing alongside foreign investors.

Approximately 99% of Romanian firms are micro or small enterprises. Many remain undercapitalised, poorly connected to export networks and dependent on internal financing. Romanian companies struggle to obtain affordable capital, invest in research, scale production and compete for skilled workers.

Meanwhile, the OECD found that foreign-controlled enterprises dominated export activity, while domestic-firm participation remained low even compared with several other Central and Eastern European countries.

The result is not classic colonialism. Romania retains political sovereignty, democratic representation, regulatory authority and formal equality under EU law.

But neither is it full economic parity.

It is a form of dependent integration: Romania participates extensively in European commerce while remaining weak in the ownership of the productive assets, technologies and companies that determine how value is distributed.

The Profit Question

Foreign investors do not bring capital to Romania as charity. They expect returns.

The National Bank of Romania recorded approximately €11.9 billion in income attributable to foreign direct investors in 2023, including equity income and interest. Some earnings were reinvested in Romania, while other amounts were distributed abroad.

The existence of profit outflows is not, by itself, evidence of exploitation. Every functioning investment system allows owners to receive returns. Preventing legitimate profit repatriation would damage confidence and restrict future investment.

The more important issue is whether Romania creates sufficient domestic capital and intellectual property to produce corresponding income flows in the opposite direction.

A mature economy does not merely host foreign investment. Its own companies invest abroad, own international brands, finance innovation and retain strategic control over significant sectors.

Romania’s difficulty is therefore not that foreign companies make profits. It is that too few Romanian companies possess comparable financial power.

Criticising foreign ownership without building domestic alternatives achieves little. Economic sovereignty cannot be declared into existence. It must be constructed through capital, knowledge, institutions and competitive enterprises.

A Labour Market Integrated Through Departure

Freedom of movement is among the EU’s most valued achievements. Millions of Romanians gained the right to live, study and work across the Union.

For individuals, this created opportunities, higher incomes and exposure to new professional environments. For destination countries, Romanian workers filled crucial shortages in healthcare, construction, agriculture, transport, domestic care, hospitality and other sectors.

For Romania, however, labour mobility also produced severe demographic and institutional costs.

The country exported workers it had educated but could not retain. Doctors, nurses, engineers, skilled tradespeople and younger workers contributed to the economies of wealthier member states, while Romanian communities faced staff shortages, ageing populations and family separation.

Recent immigration into Romania has partly compensated for numerical labour losses, but the OECD notes that Romanian emigration remains high and often involves workers who are better educated than those entering the country.

Freedom of movement is a right. But when movement occurs systematically from poorer regions to wealthier ones, the benefits and costs are distributed unequally.

Western European states receive workers during their most productive years. Romania carries much of the cost of their childhood, education and professional formation, then struggles to replace their contribution.

This does not mean Romanians should be prevented from leaving. It means that cohesion cannot be measured only by the freedom to move westward. It must also be measured by whether citizens possess credible reasons to remain or return.

Romanian Agriculture Inside the Single Market

Agriculture demonstrates another contradiction of European integration.

Romania has almost 3.5 million farmers — the highest number in the European Union. Approximately 90% operate farms smaller than five hectares, while 44.3% of farmers are over 65. Romania is a major producer of cereals, sunflower seeds, honey and plums, yet much of its agricultural structure remains fragmented, undercapitalised and poorly integrated into processing and retail networks.

EU agricultural funds have provided major support. But access to a common market does not automatically give a small Romanian producer equal power against highly capitalised processors, retail chains and agricultural businesses operating at scale.

Romania frequently exports raw agricultural products while importing more expensive processed food. It possesses fertile land and considerable agricultural potential, yet captures too little value through domestic processing, branding, storage and distribution.

The problem is not simply “Brussels.” The Common Agricultural Policy provides significant resources, and Romanian governments influence how national agricultural priorities are designed and implemented.

The deeper problem is that European competition rewards scale, administrative capacity and access to finance. Romanian farmers entered that competition with fragmented holdings, weak cooperatives, insufficient irrigation, limited storage and inconsistent state support.

Formal access to the same market does not create equal competitive capacity.

Sunlight between tall crop stalks in an agricultural field in Romania
An agricultural field near Câlnic and Răhău, Romania, 2011. Archival image. Photo: Paul (dex) Bica / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 2.0. Resized.

Brussels Has Power — but Bucharest Has Responsibility

Romanian political discourse often presents two equally misleading narratives.

The first treats every EU requirement as unquestionably beneficial and portrays criticism of Brussels as backward, extremist or anti-European.

The second attributes nearly every Romanian failure to foreign domination, as if governments in Bucharest possessed no agency and national elites bore no responsibility.

Neither interpretation is adequate.

European rules influence taxation, competition, energy, agriculture, public procurement, environmental policy and industrial development. Larger states possess stronger administrations, better-organised business interests and greater informal influence over policy formation. They are often better equipped to shape rules before those rules reach the implementation stage.

But Romania is represented in the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and numerous technical institutions. It is not an occupied territory. Its weakness often arises from poor preparation, unstable domestic policies, politicised appointments and the inability to define consistent national priorities.

Romania frequently negotiates reactively. Governments change positions, institutions fail to coordinate and public debate begins only after European decisions have effectively been made.

Brussels may establish the framework, but Bucharest repeatedly fails to use the instruments available within that framework.

Blaming Europe for every failure allows Romanian leaders to escape accountability. Pretending that power differences do not exist allows European institutions and stronger member states to avoid examining how integration distributes ownership, labour and value.

A serious analysis must hold both levels accountable.

From Cheap Labour to Strategic Production

Romania’s next stage of European integration cannot depend primarily on lower labour costs, tax advantages and assembly work.

That model helped generate employment and convergence, but it cannot provide lasting economic influence. As Romanian wages rise, cost-based competitiveness will inevitably weaken. The country must compete increasingly through productivity, innovation, specialised knowledge and ownership.

Romania’s research and development expenditure remains close to 0.5% of GDP, among the lowest levels in the European Union and OECD area. In 2024, business expenditure on research and development stood at approximately 0.29% of GDP. Between 2020 and 2022, only 8.8% of Romanian companies introduced product or process innovations, compared with an EU average above 50%.

These figures reveal the central problem. Romania cannot demand a larger share of European value chains while investing so little in the capabilities that create high-value economic activity.

The country needs:

  • patient capital for Romanian businesses seeking to expand;
  • stronger domestic development and investment institutions;
  • incentives linking foreign investment to Romanian suppliers;
  • research partnerships between universities and industry;
  • support for patents, Romanian brands and intellectual property;
  • agricultural processing and distribution capacity;
  • policies encouraging the return of skilled professionals;
  • predictable taxation and legislation;
  • professional economic diplomacy inside EU institutions;
  • strategic use of public procurement to strengthen domestic capabilities while respecting European law.

This is not economic isolationism. It is the normal behaviour of a state that understands integration as a tool for national development rather than as an end in itself.

Sovereignty Without Isolation

Romania does not need to choose between leaving the European Union and accepting permanent economic dependence.

That is a false choice.

EU membership remains fundamental to Romania’s security, trade, investment and freedom of movement. Withdrawal would not automatically restore ownership or create competitive Romanian companies. It could instead weaken market access, reduce investment and leave the country more exposed to geopolitical and economic pressure.

But supporting EU membership does not require pretending that all members possess equal economic power.

Romania should pursue sovereignty through capacity: the capacity to finance its businesses, retain its people, negotiate effectively, process its resources, produce technology and formulate long-term national priorities.

Real sovereignty is not the ability to reject every external rule. It is the ability to enter negotiations with something substantial to defend.

Member State or Peripheral Market?

Romania is unquestionably a member state of the European Union.

But economically, it still displays several characteristics of a peripheral market: foreign dominance in exports, limited domestic capital, persistent labour emigration, low investment in innovation and an agricultural system that produces extensively while capturing insufficient value.

This is not proof that EU membership failed. On the contrary, the progress since accession demonstrates its transformative potential. It is proof that integration alone is insufficient.

The European Union opened the door. Foreign investment supplied capital. European funds financed development. But Romania did not build enough domestic economic power to convert those opportunities into full strategic influence.

The next phase must therefore move beyond convergence measured only by consumption, salaries and GDP per capita. Romania must ask who owns its productive assets, where research takes place, who controls distribution, how profits are reinvested and whether Romanian businesses can become European leaders rather than permanent subcontractors.

A country should not be satisfied merely because its citizens can buy European products, work for European companies and travel freely across European borders. It should also possess the capacity to create, own and influence the European economy of which it is part.

Romania’s challenge is not to retreat from Europe. It is to stop participating in Europe primarily from its economic margins.

Sources and Further Reading

1. European Commission, 2025 Country Report: Romania and subsequent economic surveillance updates.

2. OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Romania 2026, particularly the chapter on competitiveness, trade and foreign investment.

3. National Bank of Romania, Foreign Direct Investment in Romania 2023.

4. European Commission, Romania’s Common Agricultural Policy Strategic Plan 2023–2027.

5. European Commission, Economic Forecast for Romania, May 2026.

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